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Can European Cities Survive within a Globalizing 
World? The Coming Age of Megacities or  
the Growth of Globalizing European Cities? 
Patrick Le Galès 
This session on megacities and urbanization is no surprise in the German sociologi-
cal association. Every urban sociologist has to learn its trade through the study of 
the passionate debates at the start of the twentieth century when Max Weber, 
Werner Sombart, and Georg Simmel discussed the relationship between cities, 
culture, arts, technological developments, capitalism and domination. They asked 
questions about the influence of a particular set of structural social, economic, po-
litical, and cultural conditions such as capitalism on the effect of cities or on indi-
vidual and collective behaviour, modes of thinking, ways of life, cultural creation, 
and imagination. 
In a limited way, we try to follow up that line of argument: Does the rise and 
rise of globalisation processes, however contradictory and non linear they might be, 
lead to a new urban form, – the global city, the mega city, the global urban region, 
the post metropolis? Is this a convergent process in different parts of the world? 
What are the implications for the European societies? What happens to European 
cities? This paper is a limited contribution to the debate, part of a research project: 
this work is a work in progress very much.  
From the early days of urbanisation, several conceptions of cities were entangled 
and sometimes opposed such as the material city of walls, squares, houses, roads, 
light, utilities, buildings, waste, and physical infrastructure; the cultural city in terms 
of imaginations, differences, representations, ideas, symbols, arts, texts, senses, 
religion, aesthetics, the politics and policies of the city in terms of domination, 
power, government, mobilisation, public policies, welfare, education; the social city 
of riots, ethnic, economic or gender inequalities, everyday life and social move-
ments; the economy of the city: division of labour, scale, production, consumption, 
trade etc. 
The city as a unit of analysis is always caught between a view which emphasise 
the diversity, the fragmentation, the strangeness, the encounter with strangers, the 
mosaics, contingent interactions, moving borders, happenings, fluid situations and 
identities, events, every day life and the infinity of interactions, complexity by con-
trast to a perspective which focuses upon integration, domination, assimilation, 
social order, control, inequalities, unity, models, patterns of capitalist development, 
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structures, and systems. From Babylon, Athens or Rome, or later Florence, and 
nowadays so called global cities comes the idea that cities are places where culture 
flourishes, where civilisation reaches its highest point of complexity and sophistica-
tion. The density and diversity of interactions are supposed to stimulate innovations 
in all sorts of ways, to free urban inhabitants from traditional cultural constraint. 
Cities are therefore presented in a progressive way, as centers of innovation and 
culture even if civilisations developed without or beyond the cities first, for instance 
in Egypt. By contrast, the City is also portrayed as the place of darkness, chaos, 
violence, riots, exploitation, wild margins, deviance, destruction, and oppression. 
This paper begins with the analysis of European cities. European cities were 
originally mostly cities that represented points of articulation between trade, culture 
and form of political autonomy. Then, when the nation-state gained a monopoly 
over organizing culture, political power and different forms of exchange, European 
cities became integrated into this national whole. Integration meant that the nation-
state, which organized the economy, became the main force influencing the future 
evolution of cities. In terms of social structures: cities were formerly dominated by 
associations of burghers. The more the city was integrated into the state, the more 
dominant became those who made it their business to serve the state. 
I have argued elsewhere (Le Galès 2002), following Kaelble, Tilly, Therborn, 
Crouch and Mendras that the long-term meta-stability of the European urban 
structure has been central regarding the making and development of European 
societies.1 This stability goes together with its original structure (the high concentra-
tion of medium-sized cities) and the remains of its physical form. European cities (if 
we set London and Paris apart) although they are gaining more autonomy, are still 
structured and organized within European states – in particular, welfare states. The 
ongoing restructuring process does represent a threat, but – for the time being – 
European cities are supported and to some extent protected by the state, including 
in terms of resources. European cities are becoming more European, in the sense 
that the institutionalization of the EU is creating rules, norms, procedures, reper-
toires, and public policies that have an impact on most, if not all, cities. The EU 
also is a powerful agent of legitimation. By designing urban public policies and 
agreeing (under the influence of city interests) to mention the idea of ›a Europe of 
—————— 
 1  The perspective on European cities does not aim at conservatism, at the celebration of the myth of 
the urbanity of the European city – balanced, welcoming, innovative, and dynamic, isolated from 
any restructuring of the labour market, from globalization processes, social conflicts, re-organized 
power relations, new forms of domination, deregulation of transport, telecommunications, and 
energy services, as well as from pollution and from persistent and developing forms of poverty. It is 
not an attempt to legitimize a European model sheltered within the borders of the illusory ›fortress 
Europe‹, so that we could more easily ignore what happens around the Mediterranean and in Africa, 
distance ourselves from the United States, and remain almost unmoved by changes in the faraway 
lands of Asia or South America. Europe is only a part of the world and it is in the making.  
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cities‹ as one of the components of the EU, it is giving a boost to cities to act and to 
behave as actors within EU governance. This also, to some extent, leads other ac-
tors – for instance: firms – to take European cities more seriously. Another point 
relates to their economic and social structure: European cities are characterized by a 
mix of public services and private firms, including a robust body of middle class and 
lower-middle class public sector workers, who constitute a firm pillar of the social 
structure. Despite increasing social tensions, inequalities, even riots at times. There 
is no ideal world of European cities but the remains of a less inequal social structure 
than in most cities in the world. The more important the welfare state and the scale 
of redistribution (north of Europe), the lesser the level of inequality and poverty. 
Both the form of the city, the existence of public spaces, the mix of social groups, 
and despite powerful social segregration mechanisms, one can suggest the idea of 
continuing sense of »urbanity« still characterizing European cities (Zijderveld 1998). 
Despite sprawling movements in most European cities, the resistance of the old city 
centers epitomizes their peculiarity. Lévy takes the example of large public collective 
transport (in particular the tramway) together with pedestrian areas and cycling 
paths to demonstrate the remaining strength of the idea of European city. Finally, 
there is a continuing representation of the city as a whole, Colin Crouch (1999) 
suggests a »Durkheimian« view of the city which still exists in Europe. The in-
creased legitimacy of political urban elites sustains and re-invents this presentation. 
European cities are still strongly regulated by public authorities and complex ar-
rangement of public and private actors. European cities appear to be relatively ro-
bust, despite pressures from economic actors, individuals, and states (including 
welfare states) being reshaped within the European Union. Processes of exclusion, 
strengthening and transformation of inequalities, segregation, and domination are 
also unfolding in these cities. The development of residential suburbs separated 
from the city and of polycentric cities, the isolation of disadvantaged districts, the 
development of cultural complexes, leisure facilities and shopping centers, as well as 
diverse cultural models and migrations, all clearly demonstrate the pressures exerted 
on the traditional medium-sized city. Finally – and this point is vital to my analysis – 
actors within cities have been strongly mobilized to direct the future of cities. 
Yet, focusing on European cities nowadays goes hand in hand with analysis of 
forms of interdependence between scales, between levels of government, multilevel 
strategies of social actors and linkages between forms of mobility and local societies. 
It would be a vain exercise to work on European cities without applying onself at all 
to the global strategies of major firms from private developers to utilities and leisure 
firms, to the transnational communities that weave links on both sides of the 
Mediterranean or towards the Rast, to the competition rules drawn up and then 
imposed in the European Union context, or to the restructuring of welfare states. 
We must first come through national perspectives on cities, and then compare 
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European cities with cities on other continents, including in terms of the dissemina-
tion of models.  
European cities make a fairly general category of urban space, relatively original 
forms of compromise, aggregation of interest and culture which brings together lo-
cal social groups, associations, organised interests, private firms and urban govern-
ments. The pressures created by property developers, major groups in the urban 
services sector, and cultural and economic globalization processes, provoke re-ac-
tions and adaptation processes of actors within European cities, defending the idea 
of a fairly particular type of city that is not yet in terminal decline. The mo-dernized 
myth of the European city remains a very strongly mobilized resource, and is 
strengthened by growing political autonomy and transverse mobilizations. However 
debateable and contested, the point on the strength and originality of the European 
cities model has been made. The question remains, what happens next? 
By contrast, some authors in the urban studies field – economists and geogra-
phers in particular – tend to suggest an alternative scenario: that the rise of global or 
megacities is unavoidable. Rogowski has gone on to propose an exercise somewhat 
in the style of Zipf’s Law (established in 1941), which pointed out that, on average 
and in a large number of countries, a country’s second city had about half the num-
ber of inhabitants that the biggest city had, that its third city had about a third of 
the largest population, the fourth a quarter etc. After some decades of European 
integration and the continuous removal of trade barriers and obstacles to the mo-
vement of goods and people, the European Union should reach a spatial equilib-
rium. (Rogowski suggests a period of fifty years for this.) By applying Zipf’s Law, he 
deduces that there will be a megalopolis of 21 million inhabitants and several con-
urbations of three million people, as there are today; but above all he predicts a 
decline by half in the number of urban agglomeration with one to three million 
inhabitants and in the number of smaller cities i.e. the break-up of the core of urban 
Europe:  
»Of cities like Amsterdam, Antwerp, Barcelona, Brussels, Copenhagen, Dublin, Frankfurt, 
Hamburg, Lisbon, Liverpool, Lyons, Manchester, Marseilles, Munich, Naples, Newcastle, Nurem-
berg, Stockholm, Stuttgart, Turin and Vienna, half must either grow or decline: expanding to 
become one of the six or seven European urban giants, or declining into provincial insignificance 
(…). The carnage will likely be most pronounced among the mid-sized cities of Germany and the 
United Kingdom.«  
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1. Cities, Metropolis, Megacities 
A good body of the urban sociology literature has developed upon the analysis of 
the metropolis by contrast to the old European city, a major theme for the founding 
fathers of Sociology from Durkheim to Weber. 
For observers of the late nineteenth and early twentieth century (and Simmel in 
particular), the development of large cities, metropolis is a major phenomenon, 
both in Europe and then in the United States. Capital cities benefited from the 
consolidation of states, the shift of political life onto the national level, and the 
strengthening of the states’ and therefore the bureaucracies’ (including the army’s) 
capacity for control, as well as from industrial development and colonization. These 
major cities absorbed a large part of the flow of migration, thus providing sizeable 
reserves of labor. They were the first beneficiaries of the transport revolution, from 
tramways to road and rail networks. Open to the world in an era that saw increasing 
numbers of different kinds of exchanges, discoveries, and technical innovations, 
they established their role by organizing universal exhibitions and great fairs. Con-
cerned with public health and safety, governments organized major improvement 
works, created wide avenues and constructed new public buildings: stations, squares 
and monuments that symbolized their dynamism and technical progress. These 
cities were also places of speculation, of public and private investment in housing, 
and of financial capital. Their cultural influence changed scale because of more 
rapid diffusion, transports and colonial empires. London, Paris, Berlin, Vienna in 
particular were the theaters of extraordinary physical and cultural transformations. 
As university cities and cultural centers, they were the focus of unrest and the sites 
of the political and social revolts that punctuated the nineteenth century. The great 
metropolis became the site of consumption, of department stores and wide ave-
nues, of overstimulation that changed the urban cultural experience. This led also to 
physical transformation with ever increasing diffusion of urbanization around those 
large metropolises, hence the rise of suburbs, either working class ones as the red 
belt in Paris or bourgeois suburbs where middle classes abandoned the center. 
The rise of the large metropolis became an American feature: New York and 
Chicago and later Los Angeles in particular gradually replaced European cities in the 
urban imagination of the modernist metropolis. They grew thanks to stunning eco-
nomic development and massive immigration.  
Urbanization is reaching a new high in the contemporary world with the rise of 
mega cities beyond eight million inhabitants such as Calcutta, Los Angeles, Cairo, 
Tokyo, New York, Bombay or Seoul. Beyond the modern metropolis, researchers 
try to make sense of those large urban areas: »Mega cities«, »postmetropolis«, 
»global cities«, and »global city-regions«. Processes of globalization, including trans-
national migration architecture, financial transactions, transport flux, or dissemina-
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tion of technological innovations contribute to the rise of mega cities in different 
parts of the globe. The traditional ideas of the city, the modern metropolis or the 
industrial city are now associated or replaced by contradictory images of those mega 
cities where one either emphasizes cultural diversity and an infinite range of inter-
actions or the strength of control and capital accumulation by dominant groups. 
The rise of mobility and transnational flux within more globalized capitalist cities 
raise new issues about assimilation, social order, politics and culture in cities. Cities 
are reshaped by local groups and culture, interacting, adapting or protesting against 
globalized flows. 
In the literature, the question of the megacity (or global cities, or global city re-
gions) is related to issues of globalization. We are now of course all aware that glob-
alization processes represent more than one form of globalization (Wallerstein 
2000). As David Harvey (1989) put it, globalization is a project, a process and a 
condition.  
The globalization literature takes as its starting point the proliferation of inter-
actions and flows on increasingly distant scales, facilitated by technological changes, 
which has contributed to the emerging consideration of a world perceived as a 
whole. Although there are many difficulties in accounting for these processes, one 
may distinguish the neo-liberal political project to extend the rule of the market 
from the impact of social processes – the rhetoric of uniform domination by mar-
kets versus diversity of cultures. Globalization processes are contested, varied and 
very unequally advanced as between one sector and another or one place and an-
other (Held et al. 1999).  
From that, we can now move to the different urban form associated to the 
globalisation process, i.e. global cities, mega cities, global city regions. The argument 
is usually that some aspects of globalization lead to the making of a dominant urban 
form. However from a sociological point of view, there is not much to identify a 
particular category of cities beyond descriptive issues of size and networks. Beyond 
issues of density, connection and size, or more sophisticated version of agglomera-
tion effects, there is no reason to argue that mega cities or global cities are a differ-
ent kind of fish from middle-sized cities. Difference of degree rather than difference 
of nature seems to the name of the game rather than the reification of »new mega-
cities«. 
Megacities 
The basic divide in the literature opposes a more social conception of global cities 
analysed with the tools of social science and the term mega-cities, which is coming 
from the UN and the more descriptive geographical literature. 
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If cities are defined in terms of size, it follows that some social, economic, cultural 
phenomena, processes, and structures, should be identified in that class of cities 
comprising Tokyo, Shangai, Karachi, Cairo and New York. From a sociological 
point of view, the basis for comparison remains to be seen. In order to analyse 
dynamics of Megacities by contrast to European cities, a few points of clarification 
are required.  
Megacities as Large Cities 
The idea of the large cities becoming a dominant form is not so new, one could for 
instance trace the idea in the work of English planners. A simple definition of 
Megacities is about the size and world cities about the function they perform 
(Lo/Yeung 1998). According to official documents from the United Nations, 
megacities are defined by a population higher than eight million inhabitants. The 
term Hypercities is sometimes used for cities beyond 20 million inhabitants. Others 
point to the rise of gigantic urban corridors such as the East coast of the US, the 
California coast, the Pearl rive or the Tokyo Osaka link. 
Most observers question the analytical power of that category and point by 
contrast to third world megacities. In the developing world, population growth and 
rural migration remain the key engines of population growth of those megacities 
leading to what Mike Davis calls the »Planet of slums« (2004). 
World Cities 
Peter Hall (1966) and his descriptive analysis of world cities in the 1960’s started 
from a different point of departure. He analysed world cities as part of a world 
system, focusing on them as center of economic activities, financial networks, po-
litical power, transport network etc. 
Describing and ranking world cities (including European cities among them) has 
become a full time job. Beyond classic demographic indicator (see for instance the 
database Geopolis or the figures from the UN), geographers have taken a more 
sophisticated view in order to identify the economic power concentrated in large 
cities (headquarters of firms for instance) or the role as node of networks, connec-
tions and flows (Beaverstock et al. 2000).2 
The University of Loughborough »Globalization and world cities study group 
and network« has produced a wealth of research to provide relational date to iden-
tify world cities within a hierarchy of cities, within a world city network analysed in 
—————— 
 2 See the work of the university of Loughborough and the series of working paper: http://www. 
lboro.ac.uk/gawc. 
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terms of dependence and interdependence. Peter J. Taylor in particular, in his dif-
ferent texts on world and global cities has emphasised that he does not study a 
world »of largely equal cities«. Rather in the world system research tradition he 
emphasises hierarchies, networks and interdependence, connections between cities. 
»World city network formation is the result of the locational policies of major ser-
vice firms creating global office networks to service their global clients« (Taylor 
2004), hence an empirical research programme on different dimensions of these 
sites and networks. 
Global Cities 
Following John Friedmann’s early intuition (1986) and the acclaimed book of Saskia 
Sassen »Global cities«, a whole range of researchers have tried to identify global 
cities as a particular type of cities which are particular to the new phase of capitalism 
in the new millennium (heavy emphasis on »new«). 
Classic definitions of ›global cities‹ describe them in terms of their central and 
command role in the global economy, in exchange flows – flows of travellers and of 
merchandise, and as headquarters of the largest firms and of cultural and political 
institutions, banks, and insurance companies: in other words, on the basis of their 
functions and their power to exert economic and political influence. Thus, growth 
in exchanges of goods and persons, which has accelerated since the 1970s, gives 
cities at the heart of these exchanges a special position. The development of multi-
national and then global firms means the concentration of economic power within 
these firms, which establish their headquarters – and therefore the power of highly 
aggregated economic command – in a small number of very large metropolises. 
These metropolises are thus integrated into the most globalized part of the econ-
omy, which gives them a special role. Sassen (1991, 2001) goes further, first and 
foremost by stressing that the dynamic of economic globalization requires capacities 
for control and co-ordination, which are changing scale. First and foremost for 
Sassen, Global cities are command and control centers. Global cities are cities 
within which these modes of control and co-ordination are organized, giving such 
cities increasingly extensive influence. Above all, global cities have an original dy-
namic of producing innovations for the leading services of capitalism – financial 
and legal services, consultancy, and communication. The global city is a particular 
environment, producing specialized, innovative services that enable co-ordination 
and control of the globalized economy, thanks to the concentration of global firms’ 
headquarters and of these services. For Sassen, the dispersal of activities increases 
the need in the global city for a social and economic environment that can produce 
its own codes and its own culture, thus contributing to co-ordination. She deduces 
from this that there is a new social structure, distinguished by the concentration of 
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social groups involved in the global city dynamic, who need a whole set of profes-
sional and domestic services: hence the proliferation of low-paid, insecure workers 
cleaning offices, providing various domestic services, and staffing restaurants and 
cafés. This dual structure is characteristic of advanced capitalism and the global 
cities that are its command centers: New York, London, Tokyo, and, to a lesser 
extent, Los Angeles, Paris and Frankfurt.3 
Most of this work concentrates on some specific economic sectors, telecommu-
nication, finances, increasingly media and all advanced services organized within 
international networks. 
Megacities: Manuel Castells »Flux of Networks« 
In Castells, The space of flows he identifies is first and foremost a flux of informa-
tion supported by the high tech infrastructures. Megacities are not defined in terms 
of size but in terms of nodes within ever increasing diverse networks although at 
the end he points to classic cases defined by size (see Taylor 1999). His definitions 
are precise:  
»Thus, the global city phenomenon cannot be reduced to a few urban cores at the top of the 
hierarchy. It is a process that connects advanced services, producers centers, and markets in a 
global network with different intensity and at different scale depending upon the relative impor-
tance of the activities located in each area vis à vis the global network«. (Taylor 1999, vol.1: 380) 
Again:  
»The new global economy and the emerging informational society has indeed a new spatial form, 
which develops in a variety of social and geographical contexts: megacities. Megacities are first very 
large agglomerations for human beings. But size is not their defining quality. They are the nodes of 
the global economy, concentrating the directional productive and magenrial upper functions all 
over the planet: the control of the media; the real politics of power; and the symbolic capacity to 
create and diffuse messages. … Megacities articulate the global economy, link up the informational 
networks, and concentrate the world’s power. It is this distinctive feature of being globally con-
nected and locally disconnected, physically and socially that makes megacities a new urban form.« 
(Taylor 1999, vol. 1: 403) 
Megacities: the Global City Region 
In his edited volume »Global city regions«, Allen J. Scott sets the map for what he 
sees as the emerging geographical trend related to globalisation i.e. the rise of global 
city-regions, »nodes (…) distinctive social formations whole local characters and 
—————— 
 3  For a short version of the global city model and the difference with the global city region, see Sas-
sen, Global cities and global city regions, a comparison (Scott 2001). 
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dynamics are undergoing major transformations due to the impact of globalization« 
(Scott 2001: 1). The idea is to analyse those social formations both as spatial nodes 
of the global economy and also as political actors in the making on the world stage.  
Their development is related first to the pressure and incentives of globalization 
trends. They are seen as the new motors of the global economy: issues of competi-
tiveness are central to this notion. They result from the amalgamation of existing 
localities, to construct interterritorial organisations for collective actions, which are 
more or less functionally dependent. Some can be organised around a major urban 
center as in the classic model of the metropolis, some may be the network of urban 
centers (Delta metropolis in Holland) others may go over regional boundaries such 
as Copenhagen Malmö or San Diego Tijuana. The basic argument behind this ver-
sion of the mega city is from economic geography: those global city regions are the 
center of a dense network of trans-national firms, they »thrive on the productivity – 
an innovation enhancing effect of dense and multifaceted urban milieus that are 
simultaneously embedded in worldwide distribution networks« (ibid.: 4). Adminis-
trative boundaries are of course becoming irrelevant. 
The rise of global city regions, both in the rich part of the world and within de-
veloping countries is first and foremost an economic driven phenomenon for two 
reasons analysed by Allen J. Scott and Michael Storper in their previous work: 
firstly, concentration of economic activities reduces transaction cost, and provides 
an insurance for flexibility, an overall efficiency and secondly, urban city regions 
allow the concentration of learning processes, innovation, creativity, and dissemina-
tion within all sorts of networks. 
In that brand of literature, global city regions are socially characterized by three 
outcomes of those globalization processes: cultural and demographic heterogeneity 
(related for instance to large scale immigration); the polycentric or polyclustered 
morphology of the agglomeration (including negative impact of the quality of life, 
lack of services) and the widening gap between the richest and the poorest, rising 
level of social and spatial segregation (dual city trend). All this leads to rising prob-
lems of governance. Basically, rapid economic development and drive towards 
economic efficiency leads to increasing social and political problems. At the end of 
the day however, the important point remains that megacities are complex of di-
verse knowledge supporting innovation and economic development.  
Economic/Technology Driven Convergence or Rise of the Undetermined Chaotic Urban World 
Altogether, this is quite an impressive set of arguments. It is quite striking that most 
of the explanation related to the rise of megacities is mainly an economy-driven 
change, sometimes in the Marxist functionalist tradition but without the clarity and 
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the analytical power of David Harvey’s work for instance who is far more cautious 
and precise about the rise of megacities or global cities of various sort. 
There is a feeling of »déjà vu« in those analysis. Again, the stress on the decisive 
influence of globalized capitalism on social structures, modes of government, and 
urban policies or a particular sector (finance) or new technologies of information 
and communication cannot but raise some doubts. 
This tradition convergence for economic and technological reason is well alive 
and constitutes an important body on research about global cities (Sassen 1991), 
metropolis and flows (Castells 1996). In his account, Castells offers the explanation 
that the same forces produce the same effects, despite the fact that cities every-
where in the world are being restructured in ways integral to their particular stories. 
In the same vein, in a section entitled »The fading charm of European cities« he 
confirms the marginalization of European cities, with the exception of London, as 
they are not among the twenty biggest cities in the world.  
However, if the urban is growing everywhere, then it either reflects a vague gen-
eral pattern or there are different types of urban models of cities, which may differ-
entiate, being different types of social, political, cultural, economic structures. That 
does not exclude, that all those models will follow the same path. For instance, 
given the longevity of European cities, it is possible to envisage that the general 
trends of social change are being expressed in an original way, combined with 
existing structures and with the strategies of actors in European cities. The point 
here is not to undermine the powerful transformations associated to the 
development of current capitalism but, in the sociological tradition, to insist on the 
role of social groups, institutions, states, and their power struggle in the making of 
society. Contrary to what some of theses authors suggest, the issue is not only that 
of »all power to global firms« but also of taking into account conflicts of authority, 
the interplay of social groups, and control mechanisms – in other words, the 
particular division of labour between the market, social structures, and political 
structures. 
Following the little detour of the first section, I’ll drop the word »megacities« 
altogether which is even more obviously lacking conceptual clarity than any other 
term. The »global-city-region« has many precise useful features but is too charac-
terised in economic terms. For the discussion of the second section, we’ll keep the 
language of world cities/global cities. 
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2. So what for Europe? Dynamic Globalising Cities rather than the 
Rise and Rise of World/Global Cities 
Let’s go back to our initial set of questions: How to characterize European larger 
cities? Are they different from the rest of medium sized European cities? Are they 
ever expanding? Do they essentially compare to other world/global/megacities? Is 
the structure of European cities going to disappear at the expense of the classic 
structure of European cities? Last but not least, taking a European viewpoint, is 
there something special about those world cities and what is it for instance in the 
case of London or Paris? At this stage, the argument will be based upon current 
research on the Paris example.  
A Different Category of City? Difference of Degree or a Difference of Nature 
What makes those world cities different from medium sized European cities, and 
does it matter? The argument here suggests that, in the European context, the dif-
ference between world or global cities and the rest of European cities is more a 
difference of degree than a difference of nature: there are more people, more net-
works, more contradictions, more diverse social and ethnic groups, more advanced 
services, more poverty, larger infrastructures, more powerful economic actors and 
more political fragmentation. Most characteristics are however also to be found in 
medium sized European cities, either in a less marked form or at a later stage. In 
other words, most of the characteristics associated to global cities or megacities are 
to be found, to a lesser degree in European cities, which are also adapting to glob-
alisation trends. 
Economic Development: more than the Global Cities 
Most of the research on megacities and global city regions, in a different sense of the 
word, takes for granted the fact that the future of cities and the key engine behind 
urbanization processes lies in the powerful globalization processes. There is also an 
assumption according to which cause global city regions or world cities are large 
and growing, they are crucial for economic growth. 
The dynamic of metropolization is conventionally explained by costs, logic and 
by the effects of externality. The vertical and horizontal disintegration of firms and 
the development of various forms of cellular-network organization render the firm 
dependent on numerous externalities, with slightly higher transaction costs. These 
cost-related reasons explain the dynamic of firms clustering in metropolises. Under 
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the impact of competition, of new exchange and production organizations, and of 
the increasingly relational constituent element of competitiveness, firms need the 
resources produced by territories, yet they also need to integrate themselves into 
environments characterized by great diversity, by the production of innovations, 
and by varied forms of co-operation. In other words, they simultaneously need 
more market and more non-market relations and synergies. For Storper (1997), 
such non-market-led forms of interdependence are precisely a fundamental charac-
teristic of certain industries and services and of certain territories, and this fosters 
the dynamic of territorialization. These competitive collective goods and these non-
market-led forms of interdependence are situated and mobilized in different territo-
ries: however, cities, and notably the largest metropolis, are the privileged terrain for 
their production and distribution. Destabilized by competition and changing forms 
of organization, firms are looking for territories within which they can quickly alter 
their strategies and their forms of co-operation. Cities offer »flexibility guarantees«, 
to use Veltz’s expression, there firms can find partners for sophisticated competi-
tion/co-operation games, as well as services and sizeable, differentiated labour 
markets. However, should the need arise, firms want to be able to pull out as fast as 
possible and without any difficulty. 
Most relational analysis of world/global cities stresses the concentration of com-
mand and control functions. In Europe, that also applies to London, Paris and to a 
lesser extent a few other ones.  
What is the real impact of this on the economic development. In France and 
Britain analysis of economic growth and productivity has pointed on the increasing 
gap between London, Paris and the rest of the country in two dimensions. Firstly, 
as mentioned by the global cities thesis, the rise of advanced services, i.e. services to 
firms including financial services are much more important in London and Paris 
than in the rest of the country. However, in the French case, the INSEE analysis of 
those services and jobs over a longer period stress that the growth pattern of those 
advanced services is the same in Paris and in the other main French cities. 
There are more of them in Paris, and the phenomenon started earlier in the 
Paris urban region but the trend is the same, looking like a pattern of diffusion 
(within cities beyond 200.000 inhabitants). The more advanced among the advanced 
services are more concentrated in Paris but again it may be a question of time 
before they diffuse to other cities.  
The second element – pointed out by researchers – relates to the increased pro-
ductivity gap between Paris and France, London and Britain. The pattern is similar 
in both cases. In France, the Paris urban areas represent about 20 percent of the 
French population but 30 percent of the GDP. The gap has increased over the last 
two decades, but more with the other regions than with other cities. The productiv-
ity gap between the main cities and the rest of the regions has also increased. These 
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findings (Davezies 2001) echo directly the work on global city regions. However, 
the role of welfare state redistribution mechanism has led over several decades to 
the decline of inequalities in terms of revenue per inhabitant. Welfare states are 
therefore essential to prevent the gap, at least in revenue, between the most dy-
namic cities and the rest. The scale of redistribution reinforces the point that how-
ever global cities might be in the European context they remain set within a national 
political framework. 
One question remains however on the urban form leading to those results. It 
might be that dense networks of medium size cities around a city such as Milan or 
the Delta metropolis in the Netherlands could lead to similar types of economic 
results. The mechanisms are not all that clear and there is no reason why there should be 
one best way. 
This brief analysis does not address directly the question of the dismantling of 
the European system, the carnage of medium sized cities under the pressure of 
trade and global capitalism networks. Nevertheless, two points might be suggested 
in relation to this argument. Firstly, medium size European cities are globalizing as 
well. Many trends identified in the global city context actually take place at the level 
of medium size cities, often later or to a lesser extent. Secondly, the largest metro-
polises in Europe, London and Paris are the cores of their respective national econ-
omy. The productivity gap with the rest of the country is increasing as is the gap 
between medium size cities and the rest of the regions. There is clearly an intensifi-
cation of metropolization processes and growth, which is more advanced in the 
large metropolis. As Klaus R. Kunzmann (1998) notes however, the only large 
world cities in Europe, Paris and London are not growing fastly. Indeed, their 
growth is relative but less important than many medium sized cities, in France in 
particular. The European context is made of few declining cities, many dynamic 
medium size and large cities, and two dynamic large global cities, whatever that 
means. For the time being, there is not much to justify the decline of European 
cities or to explain that the European urban systems prevent stronger economic 
growth.  
What remains unclear is the extent to which there is a direct link between the 
concentration of headquarters, networks of various sorts, advanced services, diverse 
skilled professionals, knowledge complex and economic development or in other 
words, is there a clear size effect which has some impact on the rate of economic 
development? It may be the case that global city regions are the genuine motor of 
economic growth and that thay have a major comparative advantage. It may also be 
the case that different patterns of metropolization may lead to the same result be-
cause the combination of network, mobility, diffusion of innovation can take a 
different form. The density of medium sized cities in Europe may be a functional 
equivalent for those factors identified in the global city regions to the concentration 
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within a large metropolis. Some of the debate is a bit rhetorical when it concentrates 
on size and the location of network. Access and mobility are also central. Links 
between German cities or Paris and regional capitals (around two hours journey for 
instance) are equivalent to a drive from the East to the West of Los Angeles for 
instance. It may be the case that there is a distinct type and rate of economic devel-
opment in the global/world cities, but that is still an open debate, at least within the 
European context. One suspects the dream of »one best way« which is often im-
plicit in regional economist literature. 
Social Structure, Culture 
We do not know much about the sociological analysis of world/global cities. What 
does it mean for the socialization of actors, for social mobility, for the making of 
social groups, what happens in particular in those types of cities compared to the 
other ones? This is still a field of research where we lack robust sociological ana-
lysis. 
Most literature on global cities rightly stresses increased inequalities. Is there a 
dual social structure? This section argues that in the European context there is 
evidence of increased polarization but no disappearance of middle strata and that is 
also the case in most cities.  
›Polarization‹ refers to a process by which the poles of the richest and the poor-
est are reinforced at the expense of the middle of society, in terms of society’s vari-
ous inequalities (occupation, income, social mobility, and consumption). In urban 
sociology terms, this polarization can be observed spatially, in the reinforcement of 
the wealth of the richest areas and the poverty of the poorest areas. Beyond an 
inadequate ›dual city‹ model, areas of intense poverty and areas of intense wealth 
exist and are increasing within cities, thus recreating a mosaic of spatial inequalities 
and conflicts. 
As argued by Sassen or Scott or Storper, the rise of advanced services in the 
global city regions or global cities lead to specialised labour markets, i.e. the rise of 
specialised professional middle classes, managers, and experts with high wages. One 
of the impacts of the globalisation trend is to provide more opportunities for skilled 
social groups and to increase their scale of operation. In most global cities, there-
fore, one can notice the increase of incomes for the elite part of the population, in 
terms of skills in particular. Clear evidence of that trend has been found by Préte-
ceille (2004) for Paris, by Buck, Gordon, Hall, Harloe and Kleinman (2002) for 
London.  
Classic definitions of ›global cities‹ describe them in terms of their central role in 
exchange flows – flows of travellers and of merchandise, and as headquarters of the 
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largest firms and of cultural and political institutions, banks, and insurance compa-
nies: in other words, on the basis of their functions and their power to exert eco-
nomic and political influence. Thus, growth in exchange of goods and persons, 
which has accelerated since the 1970s, gives cities at the heart of these exchanges a 
special position. The development of multinational and then global firms means the 
concentration of economic power within these firms, which establish their head-
quarters – and therefore the power of highly aggregated economic command – in a 
small number of very large metropolises. These metropolises are thus integrated 
into the most globalized part of the economy, which gives them a special role. Sas-
sen (1991) goes further, first and foremost by stressing that the dynamic of eco-
nomic globalization requires capacities for control and co-ordination, which are 
changing scale. Global cities are cities within which these modes of control and co-
ordination are organized, giving such cities increasingly extensive influence. Above 
all, global cities have an original dynamic of producing innovations for the leading 
services of capitalism (financial and legal services, consultancy, and communica-
tion). The global city is a particular environment, producing specialized, innovative 
services that enable co-ordination and control of the globalized economy, thanks to 
the concentration of global firms’ headquarters and of these services. For Sassen, 
the dispersal of activities increases the need in the global city for a social and eco-
nomic environment that can produce its own codes and its own culture, thus con-
tributing to co-ordination. She deduces from this that there is a new social structure, 
distinguished by the concentration of social groups involved in the global city dy-
namic, who need a whole set of professional and domestic services: hence the pro-
liferation of low-paid, insecure workers cleaning offices, providing various domestic 
services, and staffing restaurants and cafés. This dual structure is characteristic of 
advanced capitalism and the global cities that are its command centers: New York, 
London, Tokyo, and, to a lesser extent, Los Angeles, Paris and Frankfurt.  
In these conditions, the global city could be said to constitute an original social 
structure. However, in this regard, Chris H. Hamnett’s work on London and Ed-
mond Préteceille’s on Paris invalidate the thesis. Both confirm the dynamic of 
growth, of rise and of segregation of the most privileged groups, but do not detect 
either an accentuation of polarization or the decline of the middle strata. The role of 
the welfare state, even in London and the Paris region, contributes to the strength 
of middle strata, particularly when the welfare state remains strong. Again there is 
not much systematic evidence. Poverty has been on the rise in most cities but the 
evidence in terms of dual structure of social segregation is more nuanced. Strong 
evidence of social segregation in London and Paris (Butler/Robson 2003), Préte-
ceille (2004) go together with evidence of contiunuum between social and spatial 
segregation, not dualisation. Of course, spatial segregation processes are more 
marked in the largest metropolises, because of the concentration of higher-status 
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groups but Préteceille (2000) has rightly noted that social segregation may some-
times be more marked in medium-sized cities.  
The changes of scale in society are partly linked to transformations of capitalism 
and to the pressure of market logics. The dynamism of transnational networks and 
the distance of these interactions seem to be growing constantly. The theoreticians 
of culturalism and mobility take the view that the dual impact of transnational 
networks and of flows of images, information and people are making national so-
cieties less capable of structuring the representations and social practices of indi-
viduals (Urry 2000). These transnational networks increase interdependence be-
tween national societies. From this perspective, European integration is accelerating 
trends that can also be observed in other contexts. The more qualified and mobile 
middle classes in urban societies are – if only to a limited extent – the more they are 
becoming disembedded from national societies.  
Culture, representations, social movements (including environmental and hu-
man rights movements), and capitalism – or at least, the vanguard forces of these 
processes – are exiting the nation-states. Sklair in particular suggests the emergence 
of a new social class, a mobile global bourgeoisie, which can change country and 
thus avoid the constraints of national societies, and he defines it as »an international 
bourgeoisie: a socially comprehensive category, encompassing the entrepreneurial 
elite, managers of firms, senior state functionaries, leading politicians, members of 
the learned professions (…) plus the media, culture, consumption« (1995: 62; 2000). 
This new bourgeoisie speaks English, and has learned the codes that operate within 
Anglo-American firms, universities, and consultancies; it is developing a common 
global culture and particular consumption practices. This global society is apparently 
organized less on the basis of major conflicts and more on the basis of professional 
networks, with norms and models of excellence driven from within the professions 
– by consultants, legal specialists, managers, university academics, doctors, account-
ants, bankers, and advertising executives.  
These processes, however limited, have important repercussions for social 
groups within the cities, many of whom are simply not part of the story. By con-
trast, individuals and groups that have the resources to play the game on the Euro-
pean or global scale and develop different forms of competence, expertise, or spe-
cialized products see opportunities opening up. These individuals and groups have a 
capacity for exit that, although it is partial and limited, exerts strong pressures on 
urban societies, and may potentially reduce interdependence between social groups 
within a national society or within a city, or may help to mobilize a spatial interest 
that reflects their interests – a city against the state, for instance. It could be in the 
interest of these elites to disengage totally or partially from national societies and to 
plot their individual or collective trajectory inside globalized professional networks 
and particular territories that are favourable to them. These groups, as mentioned 
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before, are mostly located within the larger cities, their impact is felt in terms of use 
of public space, consumption pattern, leisure, but not only in the largest cities. 
Again, the dynamics of metropolization and globalisation attain most cities, even if 
the largest are first or mostly concerned. 
However, those global cities, within their national context seem to play the role 
of accelerator of social mobility. Savage and his colleagues, working on the South 
West of England, analyzed this labour market as an accelerator of social mobility. 
There are similar fragments of evidence for the Paris region, which every year at-
tracts and rejects important groups of population, attracting and keeping the more 
educated, more specialised, more successful groups. The data on earnings go into 
the same direction but more should be known on the subject and the extent to 
which there is a significant difference with cities like Milan, Madrid, Munich or 
Manchester or smaller ones. One should distinguish the effect for the national so-
cial structure and the European or global hierarchies in different professions. Also, 
according to the set of theorists just mentioned, those social groups are more glob-
alized, more mobile and their relationship to the neighborhood, the city is differ-
ent.4 Savage and his colleagues have developed the concept of »elective belonging« 
to analyze those relationships. Our ongoing work on the Paris Ile de France region 
(with Préteceille and Oberti) also suggests it is probably fruitful to disentangle the 
different aspects of belonging to a neighborhood or a city in relation to investment 
and social practices. Instead of sharp models of middle class secession, there are all 
ranges of combination, which may or may not be similar in the global cities, the 
megapolis and the medium-cities cities. 
Briefly, the same conclusion applies to the rise of migration. Every European 
country has seen waves of immigration, frequently a long time ago, with their geo-
graphical origins often linked to a colonial empire: Pakistan, India, the Caribbean, 
and central Africa for the UK; Indonesia and Surinam for the Netherlands; Italy, 
Poland, Spain, Portugal, then Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia and Black Africa for 
France; Turkey for Germany.  
For the traditional countries of immigration in Europe, the percentage of the 
population from abroad varies from five to ten percent in the Netherlands, Ger-
many, France, the UK, Belgium, and Austria. More favourable legal provisions and 
an unemployment rate that remained low during the 1980s have made Sweden the 
European country with the highest proportion of people from abroad (11.5%). In 
contrast, immigration is a recent phenomenon in southern Europe, where the rate 
remains below two percent. For the European Union, border closure policies have 
meant that the flow of immigration into Europe has stabilized at a level that is not 
—————— 
 4  See the excellent two books by Butler about middle classes on London, and the forthcoming book 
of Savage/Bagnall/Longhurst (2004), Globalisation and Belongings, London, Sage. 
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very high and includes the immigration movements of highly skilled individuals, 
which somewhat blur the image of an immigrant. The high density and wide variety 
of immigrant populations is more a distinctive characteristic of the largest European 
cities, notably London, Paris but also Frankfurt (25%), Rotterdam (20%), Brussels 
(just under 30% of the city center population), and Stockholm. However, immigrant 
populations in medium-sized European cities increased with the growth of Euro-
pean cities during the »Thirty Glorious Years« from 1947 to 1976 and again from 
the 1980s, as well as with the increased diversity of their countries of origin. Al-
though not a large-scale phenomenon, the presence of populations from abroad has 
become the norm for medium-sized European cities, even though, of course, there 
are wide variations. Ports such as Liverpool, Rotterdam, Marseilles, Genoa and 
Naples, for example, are cities that have long played host to immigrant populations. 
This means that, although cities that are now called ›global‹ are distinguished by a 
wide variety and high density of populations from abroad, medium-sized European 
cities are also affected, if to a lesser extent. 
What are the implications for European cities? Most of what has been analysed 
is more visible and seemed more obvious in the larger cities, in London in particular 
than in the rest of European cities. The concentration of the trend underlined 
seems to be clear although there is lack of clear comparable empirical data to be 
sure. However, most european cities are also concerned by segregation, rising more 
mobile middle classes, migration, cultural diversity social exclusion. From a socio-
logical point of view, there is not much of a particular social structure to identify the 
global cities. The main point remains a question of scale, of concentration and 
diversity of groups which makes it a more difficult question of integration, and 
aggregation of interest. 
Conclusion  
There is no evidence so far of the making of a megacity within the European con-
text beyond the cases of London and Paris. If one brings together series of cities in 
England, in the Netherlands, Benelux or the North of Germany, there is always the 
possibility to »discover« other megacities – but that does not change the existing 
framework. For the time being, there is no particular rapid growth of Paris or Lon-
don at the expense of European medium size cities. The scenario of »obsolete 
European cities«, is not on the card, for now. 
Most trends characterising global cities are also taking place in most European 
cities. There is little evidence to suggest that, in the European context, global or 
world cities are a particular category of cities beyond the concentration of networks, 
968 P L E N U M  X V :  M E G A S T Ä D T E  U N D  E U R O P Ä I S C H E  S T Ä D T E  
 
headquarters, more diverse interests, more ethnic minorities fragmentation. Briefly, 
the politics of world or global cities is also difficult to identify. Eckhart or Wilk-
Heeg attempts to identify the main feature comes out with: the importance of 
economic interest, the role of infrastructure and protest movement, the pressure on 
economic development policies on housing, planning or welfare, the politics of 
urban projects (Moulaert et al. 2003). In Europe, urban flagship projects are 
emblematic of this desire of cities to re-affirm their importance and to take their 
place in European and globalized networks, as witnessed by the rebuilding of the 
Potsdamer Platz in Berlin or the regeneration of the London Docklands, but that is 
also true, possibly to a lesser extent, in other cities. The contradictions of capitalism 
are more marked in global cities, there are more interests, less capacity to integrate, 
and a fragmented governance (Préteceille 2000; Scott 2002).  
Does this lead to something else? There is not yet much research on various ef-
fects of globalization (or europeanisation, mobility etc.) on urban social structures, 
hence lots of questions about the »megacities« or its equivalent from a sociological 
point of view. 
However, the impact of rising trade, exchange, and economic restructuring will 
increase with the European enlargement, accompanied by the policies of one of the 
first neo liberal commission. Will Europe keep its model of limited inequalities, 
territorialisation (structure of medium size cities) and economic development or, as 
suggested by some economists, will this European model be dismantled by the 
pressure of economic forces? Still early days to conclude.  
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